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Introduction 
In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter North Korea), citizens risk their 
lives everyday to consume outside information and media illegally. From the beginning of its 
history, the North Korean government has worked to restrict access to outside information in 
nearly all forms. Despite North Korea’s isolation from the outside world, North Koreans still 
manage to access foreign movies, music, television shows, and radio, in addition to other word 
of mouth forms of communication. This thesis will explore why North Koreans consume this 
media, at great risk to themselves, and how consumption of foreign media impacts their 
perceptions of the state, based on firsthand accounts from North Korean defectors. 
North Korea works to prevent its citizens from sharing information with each other at all 
levels, and the scrutiny on information entering from outside the country is even more intense. 
Despite its proximity to some of the world’s wealthiest and most densely populated countries, 
such as the Democratic People’s Republic of China (hereafter China), the Republic of Korea 
(hereafter South Korea), and Japan, North Korea is considered one of the most isolated nation 
states on the planet (“Freedom of the Press 2017”). In North Korea, it is illegal to consume any 
media (radio, books, television, films, or music) that is not sanctioned by the state. As a result, 
the only legal sources of information are those produced by the all powerful Korean Workers’ 
Party. Initially, North Korean permitted books and films from other communist countries, mainly 
the Soviet Union and the newly declared People’s Republic of China, but over time, even outside 
communist media was banned as well (Lankov 43-4.). Today, North Koreans caught possessing 
foreign DVDs, listening to foreign radio stations, or watching foreign movies or television shows 
risk a range of punishment by the state, from a few months in a political prison camp to public 
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execution. News publications from as recently as 2015 and 2017 report North Koreans who have 
been sentenced to death for the crime of listening to music and watching movies produced in 
South Korea (Choe, C. Kim). To understand why the North Korean regime considers foreign 
information so dangerous and subversive, it is necessary to review the history of its origins. 
On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was declared in 
Pyongyang by Kim Il-Sung, a famed guerilla fighter from the Second World War notorious for 
his attacks against the Japanese empire in China and Korea (Lankov 4). Kim, in an effort to 
bolster his own legitimacy as a leader, created a cult of personality for himself and his family, 
crafting North Korean society in a way that placed the state at the center of each citizen’s life. 
Early on in his reign, private trade was totally banned and the state was positioned as the sole 
provider for food and other daily necessities. All able bodied men were required to work for the 
state, and free movement between cities was outlawed, requiring a permit to travel even to the 
nearest village (Lankov 38). The results of these restrictions were twofold. First, it made North 
Koreans wholly dependent on the state for all of its basic necessities, legitimizing the power of 
the socialist state and fostering support for Kim Il-Sung. Second, by ensuring that North Koreans 
only needed the state for their survival, the Kim regime effectively isolated generations of its 
citizens. There were no marketplaces in which citizens could meet each other to share personal 
stories and discuss the events of the day; food only came through the ration system. One did not 
have to network to look for jobs; each person was only an employee of the state. And finally, 
even if one had family in another village, they were strictly limited on when they were able to 
leave their town for another. These policies, which began under the leadership of Kim Il-Sung, 
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have remained mostly static throughout the subsequent rule of his son, Kim Jong-Il, and his 
grandson, Kim Jong-Un.  
Additionally, North Koreans are forbidden from being in a house that is not their own 
after a certain time of night without prior approval. Each night, the local police will perform 
checks on randomly selected houses to make sure no one is inside that is not assigned to the 
property. Often, this is framed as a way to prevent people from gathering to secretly plot 
resistance to the state, but it also prevents citizens who are not related to each other from 
spending extended periods of time together and developing feelings of kinship for each other. 
Any sense of comradery would limit the effectiveness of the ​inminban ​system, in which citizens 
within a village are placed into groups that are expected to spy on each other and keep each other 
in line. An ​inminban​ might be an entire neighborhood block or an entire floor of an apartment 
building. Each ​inminban​ is headed up by a local leader who reports directly to the local police 
(Lankov 38-9). Citizens also attend weekly criticism meetings with their entire ​inminban​, in 
which people offer criticism about themselves and their neighbors regarding how they could 
have better served the socialist state. Criticism meetings are also an occasion for propaganda 
sessions and continuing education about the victories of the Kim family and the evils of the 
United States (Lankov 41). 
Another way in which North Koreans are separated from each other is through their 
songbun​ status, a strict class system based on one’s family’s loyalties during World War II and 
the Korean War (Baek 7-9). Everyone alive in the 21st century, which increasingly includes 
people with no memory of these wars and their aftermath, have had their economic opportunities 
already assigned to them based on whom their grandparents or great-grandparents supported 
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during the conflicts. There are 51 categories in total, but the three major classes are the core 
class, the wavering class, and the hostile class. If a citizen’s family members fought against the 
Japanese during World War II, they and all of their descendents will occupy the core class. 
Additionally, if one’s parent or grandparent was killed during the Korean War, that person would 
also be in the core class. The wavering class is made up of citizens whose family members may 
have defected and those who have spent time in political prison camps but were released (Baek 
8). The hostile class consists of the children and grandchildren of former Japanese colonial 
administrators, landlords, priests, and entrepreneurs. ​Songbun​ status is almost entirely 
unchangeable, and when one’s class ranking changes, it is almost always a downward movement 
(Lankov 41-2).  
A 2014 report from the United Nations General Assembly referred to the ​songbun​ system 
as “state sponsored discrimination.” Throughout North Korea’s history, ​songbun​ has been used 
to determine housing, occupation, university entrance, food rations, and marriage opportunities 
for all citizens (United Nations, General Assembly). The influence of ​songbun​ has begun to 
gradually wane in North Korea due to marketization, because now wealth and the ability to bribe 
supervisors, teachers, and police also factor into access to these privileges. However, the goal of 
songbun ​is still clear: divide citizens, and limit interactions between groups of people who may 
have differing life experiences, especially those who are well off in society and those who are 
barely surviving. ​Songbun​ restricts interactions between the rich and the poor, barring citizens 
from gaining information about the increasingly wide wealth gap in North Korea.  
The goal of the North Korean state is to create an environment in which citizens cannot 
trust anyone. By preventing citizens from gathering in each other’s homes or public spaces, the 
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state limits the opportunities for citizens to commiserate with each other and compare their 
standards of living. By creating a system in which citizens are expected to spy on each other, the 
state guarantees that even when citizens interact with each other outside the home, those 
interactions will be shallow and will not reveal anyone’s true attitudes toward the regime. Even if 
a person thought there was a chance that someone might share in their frustrations or confirm 
their suspicions that life is better on the outside, that someone might also be an undercover police 
officer, and to say something might mean risking their life or years in a political prison camp. 
Moreover, to say something might mean your family members are arrested as well, or at the very 
least blacklisted for life (Baek 33). International public hearings conducted by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council, in addition to individual interviews and memoirs of North 
Korean defectors, reveal the hellish conditions inside these prison complexes, in which the use of 
forced labor, torture, forced abortions, and random public executions are widespread (United 
Nations, General Assembly). Repeatedly expressing discontent to a fellow citizen can be 
punishable by months in a prison camp, but North Korea’s fear-based regime hinges upon the 
fact that the state does not need a reason to arrest and sentence citizens without a trial.  
Yet despite threats of imprisonment, torture, or death, North Korea is undergoing what 
the research firm Intermedia calls a “quiet opening” (Kretchun). Since the late 1990s, North 
Korea’s borders, while remaining closed on paper, have gradually begun to open up in practice. 
North Koreans today have access to foreign media that is smuggled over the country’s border 
with China, which they purchase illegally in now legal market settings. North Koreans have 
learned to tune their state-issued radios to pick up illegal frequencies and purchase small laptop 
computers on the black market with USB drives filled with entire movies or seasons of a 
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television series, mostly from South Korea and the United States. They trade DVDs and USB 
drives with their neighbors, and they gather in houses late at night to watch these programs 
together (Baek). According to an Intermedia study from 2012, based on interviews with North 
Korean defectors, 39% of respondents admitted to watching foreign DVDs while in North Korea 
(Kretchun 11), and 24% had watched a foreign television show (Kretchun 13). 
Why are North Koreans willing to risk their lives to consume foreign media? What are 
the methods of consumption, and what have North Koreans themselves stated about what they 
are willing to put on the line in order to watch a South Korean television drama or listen to an 
American radio broadcast? The goal of this thesis is to uncover the motivations of North Korean 
defectors to consume foreign media in spite of its risks. This will be accomplished by 
cataloguing interviews conducted by researchers with North Korean defectors regarding their 
lives within North Korea and their interactions with foreign media sources. This project will 
conclude with a discussion of common themes through defector testimonies and speculation on 
what foreign media flows within North Korean mean for the future of the authoritarian Kim 
family regime.   
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Literature Review 
North Korean Defectors and Their Testimonies 
North Korea and its people are inherently difficult subjects to research, due to strict, 
state-enforced isolation. Even though outside information now flows into the country through a 
variety of conduits, it is impossible to hear about it from anyone currently living inside North 
Korea. Reporters and tourists are permitted entrance into the country on a limited basis, but 
every aspect of their visit is staged. Foreigners are constantly accompanied by handlers from the 
North Korean government who monitor every moment of their visit and prevent them from 
freely interacting with North Korean citizens. When foreigners are permitted to speak with 
“average citizens,” these conversations remain at a surface level and never venture into criticism 
of the regime or the daily challenges faced by North Koreans (Hassig and Oh 6). Thus, the only 
way to gather firsthand knowledge about the experiences of North Koreans is from those who 
have defected and illegally left the country.  
According to data from the South Korean Ministry of Unification, 33,523 defectors have 
entered South Korea since the year 1998. Provisional data from 2019 reported 1,047 defectors 
resettled in South Korea that year. 202 of these defectors were men, whereas 845 defectors were 
women (“Policy on North Korean Defectors”). In fact, since 2006, women have made up 75% or 
more of defectors resettled in South Korea every single year. This is generally because North 
Korean women, unlike men, do not have state assigned jobs, so they are not always “missed” 
once they leave North Korea. Many women make numerous trips between China and North 
Korea in order to work in China and bring money back home to their families (Fahy 110-14). 
Inevitably, some of those women leave North Korea permanently.  
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North Korean defectors usually exit the country via its northern border with China, 
although rarely a North Korean soldier will miraculously cross over the Demilitarized Zone, 
heavily guarded by both sides and riddled with land mines, into South Korea. Often, a former 
family member who has already defected, or a professional smuggler, will assist with the 
defection (Baek xxi). Once in China, defectors face a constant risk of deportation back to North 
Korea if they are detained by Chinese authorities, until they either leave China or arrive at a 
South Korean embassy in China. The dangers faced by North Korean defectors outside of South 
Korea means it is difficult to calculate the number of defectors not officially resettled through the 
Ministry of Unification. Since Kim Jong-Un took power in 2011, the number of North Korean 
defectors resettled has dropped sharply, due to a reinforcement of the northern border by both 
North Korea and China. Since then, North Korea has increased both legal penalties for those 
caught attempting to escape and the incentives for citizens who provide the police with tips about 
attempted escapes by neighbors or family members (Gyupchanova).  
Once North Koreans arrive on South Korean soil, they are immediately granted 
citizenship, per the South Korean constitution. Before they are released into South Korean 
society - and after they have been vetted and confirmed to not be spies - all North Koreans 
undergo a three-month entry program at a facility run by the Ministry of Unification called 
Hanawon. At Hanawon, North Koreans are taught life skills to help them to cope with their new 
environment and to learn to live in a free and open society. Hanawon also offers instruction on 
themes such as democracy, free market capitalism, human rights, and civic duties (Baek xxii). 
The South Korean government spends nearly $70 million per year on the resettlement of North 
Korean refugees, but the program has received criticism for what some claim is its failure to 
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adequately provide for North Koreans after the three month period has passed, and to prepare 
them for the discrimination they will face from South Koreans (Kang). Additionally, there are 
some questions surrounding the impact of the initial Hanawon interview process on the accuracy 
of defector testimonies. According to one anonymous university professor based in Seoul, in an 
interview with Jieun Baek, “Every North Korean defector’s story is contaminated by the 
National Intelligence Services’ interrogation process before they even enter Hanawon. They 
naturally gain a bias of whatever to say to future interviewers” (195).  Questions regarding the 
effectiveness of Hanawon arose again in September 2019, when a North Korean mother and her 
three year old son were found dead in their Seoul apartment among speculation that the pair had 
starved to death (V. Kim). 
The alleged priming of defectors that takes place at Hanawon is just one reason why 
skepticism, if not outright dismissal, of the memoirs and testimonies of North Korean defectors 
pervades the field of North Korea studies. While many North Koreans face discrimination in 
South Korea, there has been a recent trend of North Korea defector celebrities, who gain fame 
through publishing memoirs about their harrowing escapes and are eventually granted television 
interviews, TED talks, and upwards of tens of thousands of dollars in speaking fees. Reality 
television shows featuring North Korean defectors, such as ​Now​ ​On My Way to Meet You ​and 
Let’s Go Together​, have experienced some popularity in South Korea (Cussen 143). Because of 
the fame rewarded to some defectors, who share tales of human trafficking, rape, starvation, and 
torture, academics studying North Korea have dismissed them as propaganda tools of the South 
Korean government. Condemnations of defector memoirs and testimonies have been 
strengthened by the discovery in recent years of factual inaccuracies in two of the most famous 
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defector memoirs, Yeonmi Park and Maryanne Vollers’s ​In Order to Live: A North Korean 
Girl’s Journey to Freedom​ and Shin Dong-hyuk and Blaine Harden’s ​Escape From Camp 14 
(Jolley, Fifield 2015).  
There are several prongs to the case for disregarding firsthand accounts from defectors 
about life inside North Korea. First, critics on the left of South Korea’s political spectrum claim 
that conservatives in the government manipulate the testimonies of North Korean defectors to 
continually agitate anti-North sentiments. Indeed, there is a historical basis for this argument, 
given that the government of right-wing military dictators in the 1960s and 70s actively recruited 
defectors to serve in its “war of public opinion” against North Korea (Martin). Critics of defector 
accounts believe that the government feeds ideas to North Koreans regarding how they should 
talk about their experiences, through programs like Hanawon. Similarly, many experts discredit 
these accounts because they believe defectors are fed narratives from the publishing companies 
that produce popular defector memoirs, in order to produce headlines and create a buzz around 
their releases. Feminist academics argue that these accounts are grounded in sexist tropes about 
helpless, innocent, and damaged women, especially because the majority of defectors are female. 
Finally, another common argument is that North Korean defectors have been brought up in a 
society of brainwashing in which lying is a necessary survival technique. Thus, we cannot be 
surprised when these same people show inconsistencies in their accounts, if not outrightly lie to 
the media (Cussen 143-6).  
In the pursuit of studying North Korea, it is impossible to find a “pure” defector 
testimony free of bias. This is true when relying on primary sources for any research project, and 
should not be attributed to any particular deceptiveness on the part of the defectors themselves. 
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For this project, I have elected to rely on testimonies from defectors through interviews 
conducted in academic or journalistic settings. I will avoid using memoirs that have been 
published for mainstream audiences, many of which have been accused of inconsistencies or 
fabrications. I have chosen these sources knowing the inherent limitations of them, because I 
believe that in spite of the potential for minor inconsistencies in the details, these accounts are 
useful to understand life in North Korea and to educate the public on the seriousness of human 
rights abuses. I do not intend to pass negative judgment on the genre of North Korean defector 
memoirs as a whole, but I avoid them for this project because nearly all of them are co-written or 
partially ghost written by journalists. I trust that these journalists have good intentions, but they 
inevitably distort the messages of their interlocutors. 
The Origins of Foreign Media in North Korea 
Regardless of the challenges in relying on first hand defector testimonies, these accounts 
have helped North Korea analysts and historians to understand how foreign media enters and 
diffuses through North Korea. The rise in access to outside information can be traced back to the 
early 1990s, during North Korea’s famine, euphemistically branded by the Kim government as 
the “Arduous March.” The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War 
was disastrous for the North Korean economy, which was almost wholly dependent on foreign 
aid from the Moscow government (Lankov 75). During the first decades after the ceasefire of the 
Korean War, the North Korean economy, which was reliant on heavy industry, was stronger than 
the economy in South Korea. Soviet leaders guided Kim Il-Sung through the development of 
North Korea’s command socialist economy, which provided for all citizens through a highly 
centralized ration system (Hassig and Oh 69). However, the 1970s marked a shift from focusing 
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on overall postwar development to military technology, weakening the North Korean economy 
and increasing its reliance on patronage from the Soviet Union and from the Chinese communist 
government.  
The first signs of famine came in the late 1980s, when economic reforms between 1987 
and 1993 failed to strengthen the economy. These failures were immediately followed by the 
death of Kim Il-sung, which triggered a nationwide period of mourning in which the government 
essentially shut down for three years. After a series of catastrophic floods in 1995, the “Arduous 
March” was in full swing, which would last the rest of the decade and take more than 500,000 
North Korean lives. During the three year shut down, the ration system that citizens had relied on 
for food, clothing, and other staples of daily life completely collapsed (Hassig and Oh 70). At the 
time, there was no organized market system, and private enterprise was illegal, so North Koreans 
had to develop their own market infrastructure to exchange goods and services in order to stay 
alive. Eventually, what was available in the markets evolved from basic necessities, like food 
and medicine, to foreign radios, DVD players, and even smart phones.  
In 2001, North Korea’s new leader, Kim Jong-Il, declared a new economic reform plan 
called the July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measures, which allowed the 
establishment of markets for local goods, with prices still pre-determined by the state (Hassig 
and Oh 71-2). All citizens were still required to work for the state, but they could now use their 
small income to purchase daily necessities at price-controlled, state-sanctioned markets. North 
Korea experts have come to a general consensus that the years during and following the famine 
marked the beginning of outside information regularly entering North Korea, capped off by the 
2001 reforms that allowed the market exchange of goods. At this point, citizens struggled to eat 
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more than once a day, let alone purchase access to foreign media. Even if they could afford it, 
the technology that facilitated easy pirating and transfer of movies, television shows, and music, 
did not exist yet. However, thousands of North Koreans migrated back and forth across the 
border in order to work in China and bring money or food home to their families. 
While abroad, North Koreans bore witness to the gradually increasing prosperity 
available to Chinese citizens as the Chinese Communist Party began to enact its own 
market-oriented reforms, in response to the end of the Cold War. North Koreans left for China in 
pursuit of money to bring back to their families, but they also returned with information about 
the world outside of North Korea. The realizations these trips to China brought about are perhaps 
best summed up by Park Se-joon, a North Korean doctor who traveled to China several times 
before eventually defecting permanently: “Why do people in my country have to starve so 
much?” (Baek 53).  
Over time, as North Koreans turned to the markets to survive, the selection of what could 
be purchased through the markets increased in variety. Today, North Koreans can purchase 
radios, televisions, small laptop computers, DVDs and USB drives with American and South 
Korean television shows, music, and movies, and even smart phones through the markets in their 
cities and villages. According to North Korea expert Lee Soo-jung, “The market has brought 
with it a decrease in control and an increase in mobility and has spurred the creation of human 
and information networks” (Kretchun and Kim 9). The farther north a town is, and therefore 
closer to China, the more accessible these materials are, and the stronger that information 
network is. A mass survey of North Korean defectors in 2012 conducted by Intermedia shows 
that 50% of defectors watched a foreign DVD while they were living in North Korea, and one 
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third had watched a non-North Korean television program (Kretchun and Kim). Although there 
exists a heavy police presence in all markets to try to prevent the exchange of illegal items, in 
reality, this flow takes place mostly unimpeded. 
Border guards and police officers have always patrolled these public gathering spaces and 
borders, and this was the case even during the worst years of famine. Today, these authorities are 
still a large part of North Korean society, but foreign information flows openly through North 
Korean despite their presence due to the increased effectiveness of bribes. When a security 
officer discovers a North Korean in possession of illicit media, or attempting to cross the border 
illegally (or both), the markets have created a greater incentive for that officer to accept a small 
bribe to look the other way rather than detain that person (Kretchen, Lee, and Tuohy 25). 
Monetary bribes are much more effective than they were in the years leading up to the famine, 
because now officers can take that money to the markets themselves in exchange for goods and 
services. In a 2015 study of 350 North Korean defectors, 184 people reported having bribed 
someone to avoid punishment for some offense, often foreign media possession, and 82% of 
those defectors had bribed a state security officer (Kretchen, Lee, and Tuohy 26-7). Media flows 
in North Korea are so facilitated both by local entrepreneurs and security officers that consuming 
foreign media is seen as completely ordinary by many North Koreans, in spite of their country’s 
status as one of the most isolated places in the world.  
The marketization of North Korea - albeit highly limited - since the late 1990s has played 
a critical role in increasing citizens’ access to information about the outside world. North 
Koreans travel between North Korea and China for work and return with information about 
living conditions and wages outside of North Korea. Even more notably, North Koreans return 
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with DVDs, CDs, USB drives filled with entire seasons of television shows, personal computers, 
radios tuned to foreign signals, and smartphones. Although there is a risk associated with 
possessing or consuming this media, marketization fuels the effectiveness of bribes, lowering the 
likelihood of punishment. These developments could not have taken place without the gradual 
scaling-back of the socialist command economy that North Korea was founded upon, caused by 
the devastating famine of the 1990s. 
Cross-cultural Comparisons 
Despite its gradual opening, North Korea is still an extremely isolated and repressive 
state. What is known about the media environment in North Korea comes from defectors, and it 
is impossible to speak to someone living in North Korea about their actual lived experiences. As 
demonstrated above, with the appropriate caveats, defector testimonies can provide a useful 
framework for understanding North Korea, and some scholars have advanced this framework 
through the use of historical comparisons. 
Anguelov draws a comparison between the current situation in North Korea and the 
liberalization of the Soviet Union in the 1980s (67). Like North Korea, a hallmark of communist 
rule in the Soviet Union was strict media censorship and the monopoly held by the state 
government over all forms of media. Additionally, beginning in the 1980s, a sort of “shadow 
economy” developed in Eastern Bloc countries where citizens could purchase mostly American 
movies, albums, and televisions. The most popular media formats were VHS tapes of American 
music videos ripped from the newly debuted MTV, and tapes of American sitcoms and cartoons 
(69). These media products often served as their audience’s first exposure to concepts like sexual 
freedom, gender equity, and other taboo subjects in their own countries, in addition to being of 
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significantly higher quality than domestic media programming. Anguelov argues that this 
phenomenon contributed to the “cultural convergence” of the Eastern and Western blocs, 
eventually a factor in the end of the Cold War and the connection of “two cultures of the 
formerly economically separated blocs. . .to a new globalizing marketplace. The connection was 
not simply through products but also through information exchange” (71). Similarly, North 
Korea’s economic ties to China have led to its own covert cultural convergence with the West. 
For an idea about what impact this convergence may have, we can look to the Soviet example, 
although the “shared language, cultural legacy, history, and values” of North Koreans and the 
South Koreans whose movies, television, and music they consume may have an even more 
meaningful impact on the future of North Korea (76). The end of the Cold War and the collapse 
or transition of major communist states provides other comparisons for the North Korean 
example as well. 
Given North Korea’s connection to China, another parallel that has been drawn to 
understand North Korean media flows is the liberalization of Chinese media in the 1970s (Zhang 
and Lee). Under the Mao Zedong regime, China was completely shut off from foreign media, 
and the state was the sole producer of all news and entertainment. In the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping 
commenced an era of economic liberalization, which allowed for the wealth and standard of 
living for citizens to rise significantly, but access to foreign media was still tightly restricted by 
the government. The newfound wealth of the average Chinese citizen contributed to the 
development of a black market for pirated foreign media (83). Eventually, China would slowly 
begin to liberalize different media industries, beginning with the publishing industry in 1982 and 
followed by the press and television industries in 1992 and 2003, due in part to the commonplace 
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nature of foreign media piracy. However, a black market for pirated foreign media, not entirely 
dissimilar to the markets in North Korea, persists to this day (86). Zhang and Lee argue that if 
widespread, state sanctioned economic liberalization takes place in North Korea, the 
sociopolitical impacts could be similar to those in China in the past three decades. 
While the China and Soviet Union examples make strong comparisons, the media 
environment in North Korea ultimately stands unparalleled, mostly due to the state’s sheer ability 
to maintain tight control on information flows for more than seven decades. Nonetheless, these 
examples, from states that North Korea originally sought to model, can provide insight into the 
long term impact that outside media and word of mouth information can have on North Korea. 
The Korean Wave in North Korea 
The current state of foreign media flows in North Korean cannot be understood without 
placing these circumstances within the context of ​hallyu​, or the “Korean Wave.” ​Hallyu ​is the 
global popularity of South Korean popular culture all across the world, from North America to 
Southeast Asia. There is a wide body of literature about the Korean Wave, but only a small 
portion of it refers to the Korean Wave as a phenomenon in North Korea. North Korea is an 
obvious target for South Korean movies, television dramas, and music, given that the two 
countries speak a nearly identical language and are culturally still similar. Obviously though, 
these media products are completely illegal in North Korea, leading to a smaller amount of work 
on this subject. The context of the Korean Wave is essential for a deeper understanding of 
foreign media flows in North Korea, which I provide in the following section. 
The term “Korean Wave” was first coined by a Chinese newspaper in 1998 in reference 
to the sudden popularity of South Korean television dramas among teenagers and young adults 
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(Y. Kim). Although the Chinese media often portrayed this as a sudden new craze, South 
Korea’s newfound popularity in the Asian entertainment industry was the result of an intentional 
modernization process. Up until the early 1990s, South Korea had been a poor, developing 
country, struggling to modernize after being cut off from the industry of the North and plagued 
by a series of authoritarian rulers. Beginning in the early 1990s, when liberal democracy was 
brought to South Korea, the country began to modernize, but the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
presented a series of new challenges. As a result, the South Korean government turned to a 
number of economic initiatives to revive the economy, and one of the identified areas of growth 
was the export of popular media (Y. Kim 3). Neighboring countries, which were also impacted 
by the recession, readily purchased South Korean television programs to air on domestic 
channels, a low-cost alternative to expensive and more prestigious Japanese dramas (Chua and 
Iwabuchi 4). Thus, the Korean Wave quickly began to overtake countries like China, Singapore, 
and eventually, Japan. 
Today, Korean Wave cultural products have swelled past television to include films, pop 
music (K-pop), beauty products, video games, fashion, and street food. The reach of South 
Korea’s cultural influence has expanded outside of East Asia and all across the world to include 
the United States, Western Europe, and South America. In 2018, the Korea Foundation put out a 
report estimating that there are nearly 90 million Korean Wave fans globally, up from 73 million 
in 2017 (Kelley). The continued popularity of Korean Wave media products stems from a 
continued effort by the South Korean government to export popular culture products. Since the 
late 1990s, the South Korean Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Sports has overseen the 
development of the cultural industry, directly subsidizing entertainment agencies and 
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coordinating the resources of other federal agencies to advance the development and export of 
South Korean cultural products (Kwan and Kim). North Koreans, alongside Americans, Chinese, 
French, and Brazillians have developed a taste for South Korean cultural exports, and the 
popularity of these products within North Korea could not exist without the intentionally curated 
Korean Wave phenomenon.  
There are several major schools of thought for why South Korean popular culture has had 
such strong and lasting popularity in East Asia, including in North Korea. Many early Korean 
Wave scholars, beginning in the 1990s, attributed South Korea’s cultural capital to a sense of 
“cultural proximity” (Yoon and Kang 11). This theory purports that there is something 
essentially “Asian” about the themes and styles of Korean Wave media products. Japanese, 
Chinese, and even North Korean viewers may identify with shared Asian values in South Korean 
media products that cause them to develop an affinity toward South Korean culture and a sense 
of familiarity (Iwabuchi, Lin and Tong, Siriyuvasak and Shin). Cultures “proximate” to South 
Korea sense a sort of innate “Asianness” throughout Korean films and television shows, what 
Chen refers to as a “cultural odor” (Chen 30). 
However, as the Korean Wave spread outside East Asia and began to encapsulate more 
than just the visual medium, many in the field began to view cultural proximity as a limiting and 
insufficient explanation. Later ​hallyu ​commentary has instead centered itself around “cultural 
hybridity,” which better explains why South Korean media products have mass appeal inside and 
outside of Asia (Yoon and Kang 12). The cultural hybridity school of thought identifies 
“Asianness” in these media products while adding two important factors into the discussion. 
First, that there are also more universally appealing themes in Korean media products, such as 
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romance, cosmopolitanism, and modernization. Second, the transnational appeal of Korean 
media is affected by that media’s interactions with outside cultures. Essentially, the Korean 
Wave is an example of “glocalization,” and the driving forces behind the Korean cultural 
industry take into account both its local and global audiences. 
Today, the cultural hybridity thesis is still widely accepted but has been modified to 
account for the transnational impacts of the internet and social media (Yoon and Kang 14). All of 
these factors impact why South Korean popular culture has appeal to localized East Asian 
audiences and to audiences as far reaching as the United States, France, Iraq, and Egypt (Kim 
and Nye 34). As summarized above, the media and cultural industry in South Korea has been 
intentionally cultivated by the federal government, and any nods to either Asian or more 
“universal” themes have been carefully coordinated. Although most of the field of Korean Wave 
studies has moved on from the cultural proximity hypothesis, this project will consider it as a 
factor in motivation for illegal media consumption in North Korea, especially given the shared 
language and customs between the two Koreas.  
Soft Power Potential in North Korea 
Another angle taken by scholars when discussing the Korean Wave is that of “soft 
power,” a term coined by political scientist Joseph Nye. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to 
shape the preferences of others,” or essentially when one country influences the desired 
outcomes of other states through persuasion, education, public opinion, and appeal of cultural 
ideals and customs (5). Nye contrasts this with “hard power,” which states harness when they use 
military force or economic pressure to force certain outcomes on the world stage. South Korean 
popular culture is a prime example of soft power at work, and one Nye himself has explored in 
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depth.  Nye and Kim compare South Korea to countries like Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Norway, and Finland, which like South Korea have relatively small militaries and populations 
but great amounts of “political clout” that make these countries attractive to foreigners (32). The 
South Korean government’s purposeful development of its cultural industries is a driving force 
for soft power, which has led to an increase in tourism, international students enrolling in Korean 
universities, and an overall greater global awareness of South Korea. They place a particular 
emphasis on the soft power potential of South Korean media products in North Korea, allowing 
North Koreans to “get a taste of freedom, modernity and free-market fantasies spun by the 
illegal, smuggled dramas and movies” (37). Critics of the soft power framework have pointed out 
that it is difficult to qualitatively measure the ways in which a nation’s clout can influence the 
behavior of other states, which is just one obstacle faced by a project of this nature. Still, the 
notion that the Korean conflict may be addressed through non-military force is a reality 
acknowledged by some of the highest profile defectors. 
One of those high profile defectors, Thae Yong-ho, the former North Korean deputy 
ambassador to the United Kingdom, defected from North Korean in 2016 while stationed in 
London (Thae 54). His move to South Korea made him the highest ranking official to ever defect 
from North Korea. Throughout popular and academic sources, Thae has made the case for the 
role of foreign popular media in many North Koreans’ decisions to eventually defect from North 
Korea. Although his media consumption was not the ultimate reason he chose to leave North 
Korea, citing instead the execution of Kim Jong-un’s uncle in December 2013 and a desire to 
protect his family from Kim’s wrath, Thae argues that the flow of foreign media into North 
Korea is impossible for the regime to stop and has opened the minds of thousands of North 
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Koreans to consider defection (56). Citing the soft power potential of South Korean popular 
culture smuggled into North Korea, Thae encourages major players like the United States and 
South Korea to move beyond economic sanctions and explore the possibility of expanding its use 
of soft power in its foreign policy with North Korea.  
Suk-Young Kim analyzes the role of one specific South Korean drama that has been 
particularly popular in North Korea, ​Boys Over Flowers​, and its soft power potential in North 
Korea. The soap opera follows the romance between Junpyo, the heir of a wealthy South Korean 
conglomerate (known as a ​chaebol​) and Jandi, the daughter of two poor custodians who is given 
the chance to attend one of South Korea’s most elite private schools. Jandi, through her romance 
with Junpyo, undergoes a “conversion to plutocracy,” an example of the show’s glorification of 
conspicuous consumption and materialism that has, in some ways “converted” North Koreans as 
well (98). In 2011, Radio Free Asia reported that ​Boys Over Flowers ​was one of the most 
popular pirated South Korean television shows. According to other reports, in Cheongjin, male 
students began to cut and style their hair like the two male protagonists of the show, requesting 
for the “Gu Junpyo” or the “Yun Jihu” haircut (S Y. Kim 94). The popularity of ​Boys Over 
Flowers ​among North Koreans demonstrates the mass appeal of media that glorifies capitalism, 
materialism, and other ideals in direct opposition to the purported values of the North Korean 
regime. 
Some states may exercise this sort of soft power in a way that promotes their own cultural 
hegemony, a sort of domination which places that state’s culture as the preferred worldview of 
all under its control. Gramsci first articulated his theory of hegemony while imprisoned by the 
Italian fascist state in the 1930s, which Bates summarizes as the concept that “man is not ruled 
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by force alone, but also by ideas” (351). That the world is ruled by a small group of elites is an 
age old concept, but the idea that cultural beliefs, and even culture itself, is predetermined by a 
small group of ruling elites was articulated by Marx in the 19th century and further extrapolated 
upon by Gramsci. In the later half of the 20th century, theorists began to apply the theory of 
hegemony to mass media, mostly citing the media hegemony of regions like Western Europe and 
the United States, defined as “the dominance of a certain way of life and thought and. . .the way 
in which the dominant concept of reality is diffused throughout public as well as private 
dimensions of social life” (Altheide 476-7). In foreign policy circles, there is much emphasis on 
the hegemonic power balance between China and the United States. In East Asia though, South 
Korea has established itself as a media hegemon in the region through its cultural policies and 
promotion of the Korean Wave, with its influences reaching even into the isolationist North 
Korean state. 
In the age of internet-dominated globalization, hegemony takes on a different meaning 
because information and ideas flow across borders more freely, and individuals are able to access 
media from all parts of the world from nearly any place on earth. Globalization and the internet 
have made these media flows less likely to be dominated by one single hegemonic power, but 
they are nonetheless uneven. Appadurai outlines five dimensions of global cultural flow, which 
embody the “tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization” (71). 
These dimensions, which he calls “scapes,” are the ethnoscape, the technoscape, the mediascape, 
the finanscape, and the ideoscape. Global media flows allow humans all across the world to have 
access to the same mass of information. However, while global media can serve as an equalizer 
in this sense, disjunctures between these five “scapes” also highlight human divisions, such as 
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ethnicity, national identity, and ideology. While there are still countries who exert more soft 
power than others, such as the United States in the West, or South Korea in Northeast Asia, 
globalization upended the traditional hegemonic world order in numerous ways, including 
through the disjuncture of global media flows. 
In North Korea, the ideoscape, or the conglomerations of political and ideological images 
which promote the power of the state, is disconnected from the mediascapes which citizens 
encounter through illicit consumption of foreign media, what Appadurai defines as 
“image-centered, narrative-based accounts of strips of reality” (73). The North Korean 
ideoscape, which portrays North Korea as superior to all other states and the sole provider of 
stability to the North Korean people, conflicts with foreign mediascapes that portray countries 
like the United States and South Korea as hyper-developed and wealthy and North Korea as 
poor, incompetent, and a threat to global security. This disjuncture highlights the divisions 
between North Korea and the rest of the world. 
The media landscape in North Korea encompasses far more than just state propagated 
television, films, and radio, and the presence of foreign media in North Korea has provided 
thousands of North Koreans with access to information about the outside world and exposure to 
capitalist, democratic messages. This background regarding why and how these materials are 
spread across North Korea will provide the necessary context for this project’s exploration of 






The goal of this project is to determine potential themes in the experiences of North 
Korean defectors and their relationship to foreign media. This project will use textual analysis as 
the method for identifying common themes in experiences among North Korean defectors. 
Textual analysis hinges upon the notion that texts do not exist as fixed, isolated entities, but are 
themselves sources of content and cultural meaning (Barthes). In this instance, the texts are the 
firsthand accounts of defectors, which I will analyze for similarities in content. The aim of this 
method, and of this project in particular, is to “explain the variety of possible meanings of texts,” 
recognizing that there is no singular, all encompassing meaning of any given text (Fürsich). The 
texts of defector testimonies that I will analyze in this project represent varying experiences 
inside and outside of North Korea. Through a textual analytical approach, I seek to locate 
commonalities within these experiences. The current body of textual analysis on North Korean 
defectors often focuses on economic hardships and experiences of torture and imprisonment 
(Yoon). While some of the texts I will analyze inevitably touch on these subjects, my method 
will specifically focus on experiences with and reactions to foreign information and media. 
It is impossible to make any broad generalizations about a population of more than 25 
million people, but my aim is to center the voices of North Koreans, many of whom have 
endured great suffering, and most of whom have been excluded from political conversations 
about North Korea. I have chosen to focus on accounts drawn from academic and journalistic 
sources rather than memoirs written (or, more accurately, co-written) by defectors for a 
mainstream literary audience. The first reason for this choice is the issues of consistency and bias 
outlined in the previous chapter. The second reason is that many literary memoirs focus on 
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experiences in North Korean gulags and the author’s subsequent escape from imprisonment. 
These stories should not be discounted, and those who live to tell them are deeply courageous 
and resilient. Nonetheless, intense focus on these issues mostly lies outside the scope of this 
project. The sources I have selected do not all have the same relationship to media, but all 
acknowledge foreign media to some extent and have appeared in edited and/or fact checked 
formats.  
While the term “foreign” often carries many negative connotations, in this project, I use 
this term as neutrally as possible. “Foreign” can create an “us versus them” mentality, used to 
make those on the outside feel inferior, but in the context of this study, “foreign” simply means 
“non-North Korean.” Typically, when I use the term “foreign,” I am specifically referring to 
media products from South Korea and the United States, but “foreign media” in this project 
refers to any cultural product produced outside of North Korea, typically with a non-North 
Korean audience in mind.  
This thesis will analyze the English language testimonies of 14​ ​voices from four different 
sources. These four sources are: Jieun Baek’s ​North Korea’s Hidden Revolution​, Anna Fifield’s 
The Great Successor: The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un​, Sunny 
Yoon’s article “Forbidden audience: Media reception and social change in North Korea,” and a 
firsthand account from former North Korean ambassador Thae Yong-Ho, as published in the 
collection ​South Korean Popular Media and North Korea​, edited by Youna Kim. The defectors 
whose stories have been shared in these collections represent a variety of backgrounds and life 
experiences, varying in age, location, profession, ​songbun​ caste, and party membership. They 
include the testimony of a young man who grew up in North Korea with a physical disability, 
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marking him with one of the lowest possible statuses, and the testimony of one of the highest 
ranking North Koreans to defect.   1
With this in mind, I have developed a seven question framework for analysis to be 
applied to each defector account, with the goal of identifying whether or not there are any 
common experiences or patterns among defectors who engaged with foreign media while living 
in North Korea. These guidelines will be useful for surface level comparisons, like age and 
gender, but will also explore what forms of foreign media a defector interacted with, how they 
came into contact with foreign media, and what attitudes they held toward the regime before and 
after this contact. I will also look at the descriptive language used to describe their reactions to 
the media they consume. Some defectors, for example, may be drawn to the “elegant” aspects of 
South Korean films, while others report fixating on the “romantic” depictions of young love, 
which are nonexistent within North Korean culture. Each question may not be applicable to each 
story, and the answers to some of these questions may be unknown. 
The questions I will use to analyze each testimony are as follows. 
1.) What personal information is available about the defector? Name, age, gender, place of 
birth, high or low ​songbun​ caste, etc.  2
2.) What forms of outside media did they interact with? 
3.) How did they come into contact with foreign media? 
1 ​Coincidentally, both of these defectors, Ji Seong-Ho and Thae Yong-Ho, respectively, have both been 
elected to the South Korean National Assembly. 
2 ​In some instances, a testimony may come from an anonymous source, or a person using a pseudonym to 
protect family members and friends still living in North Korea. One way that the North Korean state 
deters defection is by imprisoning or executing families members of those who do successfully defect 
(Baek 119). Therefore, even after defectors have successfully resettled, they will request anonymity when 
speaking with the press. When a defector is referred to by a pseudonym or an incomplete name, I will use 
quotation marks around that name. When defectors are referred to anonymously, I will use the naming 
convention used by the original author. 
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4.) How old were they when they first encountered foreign media? 
5.) What words do they use to describe their reactions to foreign media? 
6.) How much, if any, do they claim to have believed in North Korean state propaganda? 
7.) Do they attribute their decision to defect to foreign media consumption? 
The defectors whose testimony I am analyzing is as follows. 
 Age (at the time of 
interview) 
Province (if known) Source 
“Girl 3” 19 North Hamgyong  Yoon 
“Girl 2” 21 Ryanggang  Yoon 
Kim Ha-Young 23 North Hamgyong  Baek 
Lee Joon-Hee 26 Ryanggang Baek 
Ahn Yu-Mi 27 North Hamgyong Baek 
Jeong Gwang-Seong 27 North Hamgyong Baek 
Ji Seong-Ho 34 North Hamgyong Baek 
Nehemiah Park 35 North Hamgyong Baek 
Park Se-Joon Approximately 46 North or South 
Hwanghae (concealed 
for security reasons) 
Baek 
Kim Seong-Min 54 Pyongyang (born in 
Jaggang) 
Baek 
Kim Heung-Kwang 56 South Hamgyong Baek 
Thae Yong-Ho 57 Pyongyang (directly 
administered city) 
Y. Kim 
“Mrs. Kwon” Not given North Hamgyong Fifield 
Cho Jung-A Not given  “On the border” Fifield 
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I have selected these questions with two main goals in mind. First, by gathering as much 
demographic information about defectors as available, I will search for comparisons and 
differences in experiences with foreign media. I will explore if there exists anything resembling a 
common age that defectors encounter foreign media, or if people of lower ​songbun​ status are 
more likely to engage with illegal foreign media. This is the aim of questions one through four. 
Second, I will explore the discourse of North Korean defectors surrounding foreign media, with 
the goal of understanding why North Koreans are interested at all in foreign media, and what 
lessons or insights North Koreans may gain from foreign media. This is the purpose of questions 
five through seven. 
Based on the English-language materials that I had access to as an undergraduate 
researcher, I have chosen this method in order to allow North Korean defectors to speak for 
themselves and their own experiences, and to look for common themes throughout these 
experiences, if there are any commonalities at all. As has been discussed, North Korea is by 
design a difficult part of the world to study, although the testimonies of defectors shed great light 
on day to day realities for the North Korean people. These challenges are exacerbated by my 
own personal language barrier; the majority of work on this subject has been done in Korean, a 
language that I am not proficient in at an academic level. There is an English language body of 
research and defector interviews, but I still lack access to the full body of work on the 
relationship between foreign media and North Korean defectors. Furthermore, this project relies 
on testimonies from interviews that I neither conducted myself nor translated myself. I must trust 
in the reliability of both the researchers who have done this work before me, and the interpreters 
and translators used to relate these stories in English.  
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In spite of these limitations, this project will make an important contribution to 
understanding the phenomenon of foreign media dissemination in North Korea. Much of the 
research on this subject published to date has been focused on the process of how media enters 
North Korea. The testimonies of North Korean defectors serve to explain these media flows and 
the dangers associated with them, but rarely are these testimonies centered as sources of meaning 
in and of themselves. This project examines why North Koreans are willing to risk their lives in 
order to purchase, sell, and consume media from outside North Korea. My research will center  
the direct experiences of the North Korean people, with the goal of highlighting their agency and 
speculating on the role the average citizen might play in the future of their country. There is 
much about North Korea that is unknown to the outside world, but this study proves that there is 
much to be learned about and from North Korea, so long as one takes the time to ask the people 
who have lived there.  
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Findings and Analysis 
My analysis of defector interviews relating to foreign media reveals that North Koreans 
of varying ages, locations, and socioeconomic classes consumed and were influenced by this 
media prior to their defection. The extent of this influence varies among individuals, but it can 
generally be said that consumption of foreign media can either cause disillusionment with state 
propaganda or contribute to already held doubts about the ability of the state to provide for its 
citizens and protect them from threats. High ranking party officials and members of the lowest 
songbun​ castes alike have access to foreign media, but the means through which individuals are 
introduced to foreign media and the impact it has on their perceptions of the state tends to vary 
based on class. The descriptive language used by individuals to describe their reactions to 
foreign media varies, but in general, individuals report that foreign media provided them with 
something unbelievable and frightening but also new and exciting. Most commonly, foreign 
media provided individuals with insights about their own relative wealth when compared to the 
world outside North Korea, especially countries like South Korea, where according to 
propaganda, all citizens live in poverty.  
Overall, there is no quintessential narrative accounting for why North Koreans consume 
foreign media, or what observations about the outside world they glean from it. Media 
consumption is ultimately a deeply personal, individual experience, but there are perhaps some 
uniquely North Korean takeaways from aspects of foreign media that seem innocuous to a 
democratic, capitalist society but are revelatory to a North Korean. Media consumption and 
meaning making vary among individuals and societies, but the insights gleaned from defector 
testimonies can help those outside North Korea better understand this phenomenon as a whole. 
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“Given my job, I’d face grand punishment”: Personal Information 
 
“Of course I knew that if I were caught, especially given my job, I’d face grand punishment. But you 
know, despite all that, a curiosity, a desire for the new and an opposition to things being hidden, is 
inherent in people. . .” -​Kim Heung-Kwang 
 
The first question of my textual analysis dealt with extracting personal information from 
each defector narrative, such as age, location, caste, and profession. The majority of defectors 
studied in this project are under the age of 35, but several of the voices were in their 40s or 50s at 
the time they were interviewed. Other researchers of North Korea have noted that consumption 
of foreign media in North Korea is generally a youth phenomenon, given that the younger a 
North Korean is, the more likely they are to have only lived in a world where individuals rely on 
the markets, not state rations, to survive. ​Jangmadang ​is the Korean word for “market,” and the 
generation of young people born during or after the Great Famine of the 1990s are referred to as 
the “​jangmadang​ generation” for this precise reason (Baek 183). Movies, television shows, and 
music burned onto USB drives or DVDs are a common fixture in the average North Korean 
market, and these under-35 defectors were more likely to encounter this media because a family 
member or a close friend purchased it on the market and shared it with them. The younger 
defectors in this analysis are from varying ​songbun​ castes, and their interactions with foreign 
media were generally less tied to class. 
The four defectors over the age of 35 did not encounter media through the markets the 
first time. Three of the four defectors, Thae Yong-Ho, Kim Seong-Min, and Kim Heung-Kwang, 
were involved in the Korean Workers Party or the Korea People’s Army. Thae Yong-Ho worked 
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as a diplomat in London prior to his defection, and Kim Heung-Kwang, a professor of computer 
science at Kim Chaek University, also worked for the government policing “data crimes,” such 
as the possession of foreign media. When Kim Seong-Min served in the Korean People’s Army, 
one of his duties was to collect propaganda leaflets with pictures of and information about the 
world dropped over North Korea by South Korean organizations, his first interaction with 
foreign information (Baek 103). Park Se-Joon’s father was a senior intelligence official, 
implying high ​songbun ​status. He worked as a dentist in North Korea, but during the famine, he 
turned an illegal trading business to supplement his paltry income, which included travelling 
between China and North Korea (Baek 29). Eventually, what he saw outside North Korea 
spurred him to turn to foreign radio. These four older defectors were all of a high ​songbun ​caste 
and prior to their engagement with foreign media, they each lived relatively privileged lifestyles. 
In this study, younger defectors of all castes had experiences with foreign media due to the 
prevalence of the marketplaces, but older defectors were all of higher castes and encountered 
foreign media and information through their work, rather than randomly through the markets. 
The majority of defectors studied in this project are from North Korea’s mountainous 
northern region, specifically North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces. North Korea’s 
northern region is the least populated area in the country and farthest away from the imposing 
regime in Pyongyang (The World Factbook). The vast majority lived outside of Pyongyang, 
which reflects statistics from larger studies of defector experiences with foreign media (Kretchun 
and Kim 68-9). Outside of Pyongyang, the carefully monitored and controlled capitol, North 
Koreans are more likely to be able to engage in small acts of civil disobedience without detection 
and to escape punishment via bribery when they are caught in the act.  
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“What’s the one with the elephants?”: Contact with Foreign Media 
 
“When we watched South Korean media through DVDs, more than ten people gathered together, men and 
women, children and adults. In the [black] market, there are stores that rent foreign programs secretly. It 
was not expensive.” -​“Girl 3” 
 
“I watched a lot of Hollywood movies, Korean movies, and Korean TV shows at home. I watched all the 
Bond movies-both the American and the British series-and all the Disney movies. . .OK so I watched 
Sleeping Beauty​, ​Cinderella​, ​Snow White​, ​Tarzan​, ​Prince of Egypt​, and what’s the one with the 
elephants?” -​Kim Ha-Young 
 
Question two asked what forms of media the defectors engaged with during their time in 
North Korea. The defectors in this study refer to movies, television shows, radio shows, and 
music consumed via DVDs or USB drives. Several of the defectors also listened to foreign radio 
stations, and for several, this was their initial interaction with outside media. These testimonies 
reflect the growing number of North Koreans with access to foreign media within their country 
and existing data about media in North Korea. As previously cited, in a 2017 Intermedia survey 
of defectors about foreign media, nearly half of defectors interviewed reported watching a 
foreign DVD while living in North Korea. Additionally, 27% claimed to have listened to foreign 
radio, and 24% watched foreign television programs (Kretchun and Kim 13). Likewise, all of the 
defectors in this project watched foreign movies and television, mostly via DVDs and USB 
drives, and many others cited listening to foreign music as well.  
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While USB drives have become an increasingly popular format for storing foreign media, 
due to their small size and ability to easily be hidden from North Korea authorities, the defectors 
in this study mostly discussed watching movies and television on DVDs. This is likely because 
while the testimonies analyzed for this project were recent, the interviewees had defected several 
years earlier at the time of their interviews. Thus, their experiences represent an earlier period in 
the history of foreign media in North Korea. DVDs and DVD players were first introduced to the 
North Korean black market economy in the early 2000s, but USB drives have steadily gained in 
popularity throughout the 2010s  (Kretchun and Kim 12). Foreign media has even been brought 
in to North Korea on tiny micro SD cards, dubbed “nose cards” by some North Koreans because 
smugglers can hide them in their noses while they cross the border (Thae 59). The small portable 
media players that many of the defectors in this study used to watch DVDs have been legal in 
North Korea since 2014, with the requirement that they only be used to watch state-sanctioned 
media. Nonetheless, foreign DVDs and USB drives alike have become more commonplace over 
time. 
Some defectors cite listening to foreign radio programs as their gateway to broader 
foreign media consumption. Nearly all North Koreans own radios, but all North Korean radios 
have been manipulated so that they are untunable. Each radio can only be set to a handful of 
party-approved stations and is sealed to guarantee that North Koreans do not open them up and 
make them tunable again (Lankov 43). Nonetheless, North Koreans have manipulated existing 
radios, purchased Chinese radios sold illegally in the marketplace, and even created homemade 
radios to listen in on the outside world (Baek 98). There are a number of South Korean and 
American organizations that broadcast into North Korea, such as Free Radio North Korea, Voice 
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of Freedom, and Voice of America, to share news about the outside world and contradict state 
propaganda, and these stations reach thousands of North Koreans despite the government’s 
attempt to jam the channels (Baek 96). Several defectors discussed listening to mainstream South 
Korean radio stations like KBS and MBC as well, which did not intentionally broadcast into 
North Korea but could be picked up by radios close to the border.  
The Intermedia report emphasizes the power of word-of-mouth transmission of outside 
information, which is a more powerful medium than DVDs, radios, or USB drives. 39% of 
survey respondents cited DVDs as an important source of outside information, putting it in 
second place, but the most common and reliable form of outside information for North Koreans 
is word-of-mouth information, identified by 79% of respondents (Kretchun and Kim 10). While 
word-of-mouth transmission of information was not the focus of this project, it is worth noting 
that several defectors discussed the importance of this oral information network in North Korea.  
Question three asks how defectors reported first coming into contact with foreign media. 
My analysis shows two basic categories for this initial experience. First, as mentioned in the 
previous section, there are those who come into contact with foreign media as part of their job. 
Some police foreign media as part of their job for the party or the military and inadvertently are 
drawn to the very media they are supposed to withhold from other North Koreans. Others, like 
Thae Yong-Ho with his diplomatic post in London, may be so privileged that the general 
restrictions on media simply do not apply to them. As already discussed, encountering foreign 
media through one’s profession generally correlates with a high caste. 
The second category is those who encounter media privately, outside of their work, either 
intentionally or unintentionally. Nine defectors in this study fit into this category. Some may 
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have intentionally sought out information, and others reported consuming media with friends or 
family members who served as their point of first contact. Cho Jung-A discussed purchasing 
USB drives with her mother in the marketplace (Fifield 119). Ahn Yu-Mi reported that she 
started to watch films and dramas on her own to fill gaps in her free time after she graduated 
from school and started working (Baek 201). Additionally, some defectors did not recall any 
particular moment of their first encounter with foreign media. As mentioned, for an increasing 
number of North Koreans, foreign media and the markets have always been part of their lives. 
Lee Joon-Hee and “Mrs. Kwon” said that foreign media was just a normal part of living life 
around the markets (Baek 174, Fifield 118). While they encountered foreign media privately, 
there was not one specific moment that led them to this media. 
Question four asked what age defectors were when they first encountered foreign media. 
Very few of the defectors in this study named the specific age they were when they first 
encountered foreign media, so I will make the distinction between those who first consumed this 
media as a youth (as a child or adolescent) and those who were adults when they first engaged 
with foreign media. Among the defectors in this study, there was an exact even split between 
initial encounters as a youth and as an adult. If I expanded the youth category to include young 
adults under 35, then a majority of defectors encountered media as youths. This reflects the fact 
that the majority of defectors cited in this study were under the age of 35 at the time of their 
interview.  
“They live that well?”: Reactions to Foreign Media 
 
“We’d say, ‘Wow, over there in the South, is that how they live? They live that well?’” -Ahn Yu-Mi 
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“It was frightening, but also more fun. . .I couldn’t believe everything I saw, but there seemed to be 
credibility to most of [it]. I could see the changes in the outside world.” -Ji Seong-Ho 
“You keep listening because it’s so...different from anything you’ve been exposed to. But one day, you 
think, ‘that sounds right. . .’” -Kim Heung-Kwang 
 
Question five dealt with the descriptive language used by defectors to explain their 
reactions to foreign movies, television shows, and music, and what takeaways they had, if any. I 
have analyzed the adjectives, adverbs, and other descriptors given by defectors of their reactions 
to foreign media and ranked these descriptors based on how many defectors used them. Nearly 
all defectors, with one exception, used multiple descriptors for their reactions. The descriptors 
“new,” “fun,” “emotional,” “funny,” “overwhelming,” and “addictive” were used by one 
defector each. One defector, Cho Jung-A mentioned that foreign media made her realize how 
much North Koreans and South Koreans have in common, and another, Jeong Gwang-Seong, 
was struck by how much freedom characters in South Korean media have compared to North 
Koreans.  
 
 Number of defectors who 
used the description 
Which defectors used the 
description 
Reference to wealth in other 
countries 
8 “Girl 2,” Ahn Yu-Mi, Kim 
Ha-Young, Kim 
Heung-Kwang, Kim 
Seong-Min, “Mrs. Kwon,” 
Lee Joon-Hee, Park Se-Joon 
Unbelievable/shocking/surprising 5 Ji Seong-Ho, Kim Ha-Young, 
Kim Heung-Kwang, “Mrs. 
Kwon,” Nehemiah Park 




Seong-Min, Nehemiah Park 
Interesting 4 “Girl 2,” Jeong 
Gwang-Seong, Kim 
Seong-Min, Nehemiah Park 
Beautiful 3 Ahn Yu-Mi, Jeong 
Gwang-Seong, Kim 
Seong-Min 
Different 3 Cho Jung-A, Kim 
Heung-Kwang, Thae 
Yong-Ho 
Elegant 3 Ahn Yu-Mi, Jeong 
Gwang-Seong, Kim 
Seong-Min 
Romantic 3 Jeong Gwang-Seong, Kim 
Ha-Young, Lee Joon-Hee 
Amazing 2 Jeong Gwang-Seong, Kim 
Ha-Young 
 
The most common descriptor was some kind of reference to the great wealth and 
consumerism displayed in foreign media. This includes surprise at the size of the houses people 
live in, the clothing, accessories, and makeup they wear, the fact that people own cars, and the 
ability of people to travel freely. Through the media they consume, North Koreans learn that in 
the countries that border their own, the quality of life is significantly better, and citizens have 
daily access to goods that are considered luxuries in North Korea. The depictions of wealth in 
foreign media confirm what many have already deduced through purchasing foreign goods in the 
marketplaces or through their own illegal travels to North Korea (Baek 204). Still, understanding 
that home goods or medicines produced outside North Korea are of a higher quality is different 
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from turning on one’s television and seeing beautiful men and women dressed in elegant 
clothing, driving expensive cars, and travelling wherever they please without permission from 
their government. As one of Yoon’s interviewees summed up, “By watching South Korean TV, I 
dreamed of how to decorate a big two-story house with a handsome guy” (179).  
The wealth and consumerism often portrayed in South Korean media is not a uniquely 
Korean phenomenon, and many scholars have argued that it is the transnational, cosmopolitan 
nature of materialism that has made Korean Wave media products a global phenomenon, 
including within North Korea (Y. Kim 2013, S.Y. Kim). However, while conspicuous 
consumption is certainly a theme of some South Korean movies and television shows, several of 
the defectors in this study expressed wonder at displays of wealth generally not associated with 
rabid consumerism in the developed world. Park Se-Joon cited his amazement that some people 
outside North Korea have air conditioning in their homes, and Kim Ha-Young marvelled at the 
fact that the cities shown in movies and television shows are lit up at night, because unlike in 
North Korea, the electrical grid is not shut down at night (Baek 100, 180). Foreign media 
exposes North Koreans both to the sheer amount of material wealth in the world outside North 
Korea and the less opulent amenities often taken for granted in the developed world. 
Alongside this development gap between North Korea and the countries that surround it 
is another gap, one between reality and the fantasy world depicted in the media. While depictions 
of wealth in foreign media, especially South Korean media, are based in reality, the 
pervasiveness of these themes in media can give North Koreans an exaggerated idea of what life 
is like in the outside world. Kim Heung-Kwang remarked that after pilfering through discarded 
European cassettes and CDs as part of his job as a media monitor, he thought that “Europeans 
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must not do any work. All they must do is just play” (Baek 77). Yoon’s “Girl 3” admitted that 
she “thought that all people in South Korea were living in big houses. Since TV showed rich 
people, there’s a gap between fantasy and reality that I discovered after I came to North Korea” 
(179). Depictions of wealth in foreign media can leave defectors with an overblown image of 
what life outside North Korea is like, which can complicate post-defection adjustment. 
The second most common descriptor of foreign media was “shocking” or “unbelievable.” 
In this category, I have included defectors who use words like “shock,” “surprise,” 
“unbelievable,” “unreal,” “unimaginable,” or “fantasy.” Basically, there was some aspect of the 
stories, characters, or themes portrayed in foreign media that was shocking and difficult for a 
defector to comprehend. Most commonly, this shock was felt over depictions of romance and 
sexuality in foreign media, especially North Korean media. Kim Ha-Young recalled sneakily 
viewing a South Korean film her parents were watching called ​Birdcage Inn​ while she was 
supposed to be sleeping, about a young woman who must prostitute herself for money (Baek 
179). She expressed shock over the adult themes in the film, themes which would never be 
discussed, let alone portrayed in films, in North Korea. Fifield’s “Mrs. Kwon” remembered a 
South Korean “rom-com” series titled ​My Name Is Kim Sam-soon ​about a portly woman who 
falls in love with a handsome doctor, calling the story a “fantasy” (118).  
North Korea is a patriarchal society with traditional gender roles and numerous taboos 
against romantic relationships and public displays of affection. Therefore, North Koreans are 
often surprised to see dating and falling in love as common themes in South Korean media. Fahy 
uses wedding cultures in North and South Korea as an example, citing the jealousy North Korean 
couples may feel toward the lavish wedding ceremonies depicted in South Korea media, 
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meanwhile North Korean couples must marry before portraits of the Kim family (115). 
Furthermore, sexual abuse and other forms of violence against women are pervasive in North 
Korean culture. According to a 2018 report from Human Rights Watch, women in North Korea 
often face sex discrimination and are completely bound to the reputation of their fathers or the 
men they marry (Adams et al). The agency of North Korean women as a whole has grown in the 
decades since the famine, since women, who go undetected by the state because of their lower 
social status,  are often the ones able to travel to China to earn additional income for the family 
(Fahy 110). Still, these women face great risk of sexual abuse by officials at the border and in the 
marketplace, and those who are detained and sent to prison camps are even more likely to endure 
rape and other forms of abuse (Adams et al). In a sexually repressed society, where women are 
frequently diminished and abused, depictions of women as objects, and even agents, of romantic 
affection is indeed quite shocking. Although countries like South Korea and China still have 
much room for development in terms of women’s rights, the ways in which their media depicts 
romance and womanhood is shocking and revolutionary for some North Koreans. 
Tied for second place with “shocking” is descriptions of foreign media as “scary,” 
“frightening,” or “upsetting.” Several defectors expressed alarm or frustration over just how 
radical some of the portrayals of life outside North Korea were. What was scary or upsetting 
differed among the defectors. Nehemiah Park discussed the first time listening to South Korean 
rock music, and how he found it “loud” and “scary” compared to “calm North Korean music” 
(Baek 91). Jeong Gwang-Seong recalled how the first time he watched a foreign movie with a 
friend from school was “scary, but amazing,” perhaps referring to both the contents of the movie 
and the experience itself of illicitly watching a foreign film (Baek 59).  
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Other defectors explained how their initial encounters with foreign media angered them, 
often to a point where they would avoid these forms of media for a period of time before their 
curiosity eventually drew them back toward them. Kim Seong-Min remembered serving in the 
Korean People’s Army and being tasked with picking up thousands of leaflets of propaganda 
materials dropped over North Korea by the South Koreans each day. Some of the leaflets 
increased his opinion of South Korea, but one leaflet he recalled depicted Kim Il-Sung and Kim 
Jong-Un as overweight and hoarding food from the North Korean people. He explained, “I 
remember getting furious, thinking,’ These South Korean bastards. Even if it’s propaganda, how 
dare they defame our leaders like this?’ I got so hot in the head I was angry” (Baek 103). Yet in 
spite of his disgust at the negative depiction of his leaders by South Korea, he eventually found 
himself listening to South Korean radio stations and reading South Korean magazines. Kim 
Heung-Kwang, the former media enforcer, explained a similar process that took place within 
himself: 
“You may hear someone bashing the North Korean leader. It’s too harsh, so you get pissed that someone 
outside the country is denigrating your mother country and then think all this foreign media is a hoax. 
After cooling down for a few days, you secretly turn the radio back on and hear something more 
reasonable and interesting. Through this back and forth process, your mind opens up without you even 
realizing at first” (Baek 80). 
North Koreans do not immediately take depictions of the outside world and negative 
messages about their leaders at face value. Many North Koreans think critically about the media 
they consume and are challenged by the contradictory messages they hear from their government 
and from the media outside of North Korea. What North Koreans learn about the outside world 
when they consume foreign media may be deeply troubling or frustrating, and a conversion 
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against North Korean propaganda, if it is not already taken place, does not instantly occur 
because an individual watches one South Korean movie or listens to one foreign radio broadcast. 
The impact of foreign media on North Koreans’ relationship to state propaganda will be further 
analyzed in the next subsection. 
Overall, individual North Koreans have varying takeaways from the foreign media they 
consume. For some, media portrayals of the outside world may be fun and exciting, and for 
others, they may be deeply disconcerting. While North Koreans use a wide variety of descriptors 
to describe their reactions to foreign media and what drew them to foreign media in the first 
place, it is common for defectors to highlight depictions of wealth and romance in foreign media, 
especially South Korean media. Many defectors may have found this media shocking or 
upsetting at first, but some aspects of the media drew them back to it and kept their curiosity 
about the outside world engaged. 
“I was afraid that the slave life would continue”: Impact on Perceptions of North Korea and the 
Choice to Defect 
 
“We were taught that South Koreans don’t go to school because they can’t pay tuition, and they die on the 
streets because they can’t pay for hospitals. But as I watched Korean movies and shows, I thought to 
myself, ‘What kind of bullshit are the textbooks talking about?’-Kim Ha-Young 
 
“I am the father of two children and I am worried about their future. I was afraid that the slave life would 
continue until the time of my grandchildren’s children. . .My life in North Korea was nothing but the life 




Questions six and seven asked how much defectors claimed to have bought into North 
Korean state propaganda, if at all, and whether or not each individual attributed their defection to 
foreign media. In this case, propaganda refers to the intentional doctoring of history by the North 
Korean state, exaggerating the accomplishments of the Kim family and the Korean Workers’ 
Party, and threats from “enemy” states like the United States, South Korea, and Japan. North 
Korean propagandists frequently portray the rest of the developed world as lagging far behind 
North Korea in human progress, depicting places like South Korea as essentially third world 
countries (Lankov 56). These stories are built upon a detailed mythology surrounding the Kim 
family, who are essentially viewed as gods by official North Korean teaching. All private homes 
and public buildings must have framed photos of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, and in schools, 
North Korean children are required to memorize facts about the superhuman abilities of their 
rulers (Fifield 113). All of this propaganda is rooted in the North Korean ​juche ​ideology, created 
by Kim Il-Sung himself. Roughly translated as “self-importance,” ​juche ​was developed from 
Leninist and Maoist principles and asserts Korean superiority across the world and reliance on 
oneself and the North Korean state (Lankov 67).  
For the purposes of this analysis, propaganda refers to any messaging about the 
superiority of North Korea to the rest of the world and legendary tales about the 
accomplishments of the Kim rulers, as rooted in ​juche ​ideology. While the amount of belief in 
North Korean propaganda varied among the defectors featured in this study, generally none of 
the defectors attributed their defection directly to the impact of foreign media on their lives. Still, 
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it can lead to defection when North Korean defectors escape punishment for having contraband 
media, and media can potentially inspire defection in less direct ways as well.  
Several defectors claimed to have been deeply entrenched in North Korean ideology for a 
period of time before they began to see through the cracks in their system, and others reported 
that they never believed in it. Like we have seen with several other questions in this analysis, the 
divide tended to be based on age group. Older defectors claim to have believed the propaganda 
more than younger North Koreans, who are part of the ​jangmadang ​generation. As previously 
mentioned, these older defectors also tended to have a high ranking class status and career, often 
working for the Korean Workers’ Party. Thus, it makes sense that higher ranking individuals 
with closer ties to the state, and older individuals who remember a time when the government 
ration system worked, before the famine of the 1990s, would be more likely to believe North 
Korean propaganda. Younger North Koreans, on the other hand, have always lived in a country 
where marketplaces are filled with higher quality foreign goods and where it is common for 
family members and neighbors to travel to China for work and return with stories about the 
higher quality of life outside North Korea.  
Additionally, some defectors said that they never truly believed in North Korean 
propaganda, but they also did not actively dispute it in their heads. These North Koreans claimed 
that they were mostly indifferent outlandish stories about North Korea’s high status on the world 
stage and larger than life stories about the exploits of the Kim family. They simply repeated 
whatever they were required to learn to avoid any trouble with the state, but they did not think 
critically about it while in North Korea. Again, these defectors tended to be under the age of 35. 
Kim Ha-Young, for example, noticed inconsistencies between what she learned about South 
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Korea in school and the depictions of South Korean in television shows and movies, but these 
details did not lead her to develop any specific political ideology. She was insistent that while 
living in North Korea, she did not think much about politics or the Kims at all, stating “They 
didn’t take care of us, so why should we care about them?. . .We simply didn’t care” (Baek 189). 
Another defector, Cho Jung-A, was taught in school that in South Korea, everybody is poor, 
children run around without clothing because their families could not afford any, and people 
often go hungry (Fifield 119). However, this propaganda did not affect her or her family that 
deeply, because when their economic situation in North Korea worsened, she defected to South 
Korea with her mother anyway, despite the negative stories she had heard about the country. 
These younger defectors grew up studying North Korea’s fabrications, but they neither 
questioned them nor accepted them outright.  
While the defectors in this study each had varying attitudes toward North Korean 
propaganda, no one suggested that consuming foreign media alone led them to change their 
minds about North Korea and decide to defect. First, as mentioned above, several of the 
defectors in this study never claimed to have believed the propaganda. The fact that someone 
stays in North Korea does not mean that they are brainwashed and must be deprogrammed from 
the North Korean propaganda machine. Some defectors doubted the messages they heard from 
their schools and from state media, and foreign media confirmed their suspicions. Others lived 
close enough to the border with China that they already knew intuitively that life is better, not 
worse outside North Korea. Foreign movies and television shows’ depictions of the outside 
world did not need to change their minds, because they had already realized the dissonance on 
their own.  
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Second, the consequences for North Koreans who are captured attempting to cross the 
border with China, or for those who are detained and deported from China before making it to 
South Korea, are simply too high. Defectors risk imprisonment, torture, forced labor, and death 
to escape North Korea, and even if they make it safely to South Korea or another safe country, 
the family members they leave behind often face similar risks (Baek xx). Furthermore, defection 
has become increasingly expensive, with family members paying Chinese and South Korean 
brokers thousands of dollars to smuggle their loved ones out of North Korea, with no guarantee 
that they will arrive safely (Perlez and Lee). Even if a defector believed wholeheartedly in the 
North Korean state and was suddenly scandalized to learn that none of it is true, the barriers to 
exit North Korea are too high for the average person to take the risk. There is a reason why North 
Korea, a country of 25 million people, has only had approximately 30,000 defectors successfully 
resettle in South Korea since 1998 (“Policy on North Korean Defectors”). Because of these risks, 
there is usually some other factor besides a change in perception caused by foreign media that 
factors into an individual’s decision to defect.  
Of the defectors analyzed in this study, there were two individuals whose decision to 
defect was impacted by foreign media, but this was because they were caught in possession of 
foreign media and in communication with the outside world and were forced to escape to avoid 
punishment by the state. Kim Heung-Kwang was caught watching illegal foreign materials and 
was sent to a labor reeducation camp after being questioned and tortured in a North Korean jail 
for a week (Baek 84). Throughout his year in the camp working as a farmhand, he plotted his 
eventual escape with his family. Kim Seong-Min, the former soldier who would discard South 
Korean propaganda leaflets, was caught communicating with the South Korean publication 
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Chosun Monthly​, which worked to reunite North Koreans with family members in the outside 
world. When he learned that he had been discovered by the authorities, he escaped through 
China, but he was captured and deported back to North Korea. Upon his return to North Korea, 
he was sentenced to a prison camp, but he successfully escaped to China a second time, hiding 
there for three years before he resettled in South Korea (Baek 107). In the case of these two 
defectors, it can be said that foreign media did lead to defection, but it is not because watching 
movies and television shows so radicalized these men that they decided to defect. Rather, these 
defectors left North Korea in order to escape the punishment and lifetime stigma associated with 
the crime of foreign media possession and consumption. 
Foreign media can lead to defection when citizens are caught with illegal materials and 
forced to escape to avoid punishment by the state. In general though, consumption of foreign 
media does not appear to correlate with an immediate change in attitudes or behavior. Foreign 
media can open individuals to the idea of defection by revealing the hypocrisy and falsehoods of 
the North Korean state and by demonstrating to individuals that there is a better life outside of 
North Korea to escape to in the first place. However, this process is gradual. Sometimes, a 
person might find their perceptions of North Korea slowly shifting due to the foreign media they 
consume, but this may take place parallel to other circumstances, like poverty (in the case of Cho 
Jung-A) or persecution (like the disabled Ji Seong-Ho). These sorts of circumstances lead more 
directly to defection.  
For defectors who reported having a high opinion of North Korea at one period in their 
lives, foreign media played a significant role in changing their perceptions and revealing 
falsehoods in North Korean propaganda. For defectors who never believed in propaganda in the 
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first place, foreign media was still useful in confirming their doubts and suspicions about the 
outside world. Based on the testimonies of the defectors in this study, foreign media does not 
lead to defection in a direct way, but foreign media consumption can lay the groundwork for a 
decision to defect. In some cases, foreign media can be a direct cause when individuals defect to 




The dissemination of illicit foreign media is changing the North Korean social landscape. 
Foreign movies, television shows, music, and radio shows allow North Koreans to view the 
outside world and bear witness to the great economic, social, and technological advances of other 
countries. The increasing number of North Koreans who already are distrustful of their 
government can have their suspicions confirmed by positive depictions of “enemy” states and 
negative images of the Kim family and other North Korean leaders. While experiences with 
foreign media vary among generations, the phenomenon of foreign media consumption takes 
place with all age groups, from young children to older adults. North Koreans today have more 
access to the outside world than any generation before them, changing their society irrevocably.  
This work has confirmed that there are no broad statements that can be made about the 
experiences of North Korean defectors and their interactions with foreign media. The ways in 
which North Koreans first encounter foreign media, what they learn from it, and how it changes 
their perceptions of their country, if at all, vary greatly depending on an individual’s age, 
location, class, profession, or numerous personality factors that could never be quantified in a 
study such as this. Furthermore, based on the limited number of perspectives included in this 
study and the numerous ways in which their accounts differed from each other, no wide 
sweeping generalizations can be made about why North Koreans consume foreign media and 
what meaning they make from it.  
The defectors in this study drew dozens of conclusions and insights from the media they 
consumed while living in North Korea, and this fact alone signals just how great of an impact 
foreign media has on the perceptions of North Koreans. Foreign media products give North 
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Koreans a view of the outside world that they would normally be unable to see, and these 
depictions of neighboring countries help to confirm suspicions that many North Koreans already 
hold about their country and its leaders. While foreign media does not exclusively contribute to 
decisions to defect from North Korea, it can be one stepping stone on the journey toward 
rejection of life in North Korea. Through this process, I have worked to center the voices of 
North Korean defectors, and the key finding is the sheer amount of agency that North Koreans 
demonstrate over their own lives through the consumption of foreign media within an 
oppressive, totalitarian regime. 
When I first began this project nearly two years ago, my goal was to close this research 
with some sort of prediction about what I believe the consumption of foreign media by North 
Koreans means about the stability of North Korea as a whole. I wanted to tell a story about how 
subversive foreign media would radicalize North Koreans and lead to a massive, grassroots 
uprising. I wanted the story of foreign media in North Korea to be the beginning of the end of the 
tyrannical Kim family dynasty, and I still think that in many ways it could be. However, when 
North Koreans speak for themselves, they reveal that in general, their decision to consume 
movies, television shows, and music from foreign countries is not politically motivated, nor does 
it embolden the average person to become a capitalist revolutionary. My research contradicts the 
Western notion that North Koreans are brainwashed slaves to their regime, but it also disputes 
the immediate likelihood of a Berlin Wall-esque collapse of the Demilitarized Zone.  
Perhaps my desire to comment on the stability of North Korea stemmed from an inability 
to remove myself from what Sonia Ryang calls “securitization” discourse, or the emphasis on 
North Korea as a global security threat rather than a nation with a culture and social fabric (2). 
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Throughout its history, political rhetoric and academic commentary on North Korea has been 
dominated by security studies, a phenomenon that Ryang sources back to American intelligence 
research on Japan in order to better understand the behavior of the Japanese military, especially 
kamikaze ​suicide pilots (3). As a result of this approach, focusing on studying the enemy in terms 
of the security threat they pose, only recently has a more holistic view of North Korea gained 
traction in mainstream research. I hope that this project may be a contribution to that more 
holistic image of North Korea, a country with more than 25 million unique individuals with 
complex emotions and lives.  
In 1978, postcolonial theorist Edward Said first coined the term “orientalism” in 
reference to the binary stereotypes of the Arab world by Western colonialists (Said).  These 
simplistic depictions of Arab people have been used to justify imperialist interference in the 
Middle East throughout modern history, interference which continues to this day. Similarly 
orientalist depictions of North Korea dominate Western media, dualistically pitting the entire 
world order against the ultimate “Other,” North Korea (S. Kim 483). Throughout this thesis, I 
have acknowledged that North Korea is both a country that arbitrarily detains, tortures, and 
executes its citizens for petty crimes and one where families pursue meaningful lives and think 
little of political issues. This project rejects orientalist depictions of North Korea while 
acknowledging the ordinary people and extraordinary injustices that define it.  
An important theme to analyze in future studies on this subject is the gradual emergence 
of a middle class in North Korea and rapid developments being made for North Korea’s 
wealthiest elites under Kim Jong-Un. Anna Fifield’s 2019 chronicle of life in North Korea under 
the third Kim ruler, ​The Great Successor​, details the lives of who she calls the “elites of 
Wurtz 57 
Pyonghattan,” the affluent young people who travel the world at their leisure, drink expensive $9 
lattes, and dine with their friends in European-style food halls. In one particularly striking 
example, Fifield describes the modern Kum Rung leisure complex in the heart of Pyongyang, 
where young people exercise in fashionable athleisure wear and watch Disney cartoons as they 
run on treadmills (159). The legal codes regarding outside products and information do not apply 
to these elite millennial and generation-z consumers, and the growing freedom of the wealthy to 
access the outside world will shift future discussions on the subject of foreign media in North 
Korea. 
This increase in quality of life under Kim Jong-Un is not unique to North Korea’s 
wealthiest citizens though. Unlike his father, Kim Jong-Il, who took power in North Korea later 
in life and during a time of crisis, Kim Jong-Un became the Supreme Leader of North Korea 
during a time of relative stability, and at the young age of 27 (Fifield 98). Kim Jong-Un is both 
one of the world’s youngest heads of state and the third ruler of the longest running family 
dynasty in modern history. According to Fifield, the precariousness of his situation as a world 
leader has created an environment where the markets are more tolerated than ever before, with an 
estimated 40% of the population earning income through their own market-based economic 
pursuits (101-2). While North Korea continues to be one of the most restrictive and oppressive 
countries on earth, limited economic development is nonetheless taking place. Further studies on 
this subject should take into account this general increase in prosperity, no matter how gradual it 
may be, because it could impact the amount of North Koreans who are able to afford access to 
outside information, and potentially even to travel to the outside world. 
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Increased interactions between North Korea and some of its greatest enemies, such as 
South Korea and the United States, could also determine the future impact of foreign media in 
North Korea. In June 2018, President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un met at a historic 
diplomatic summit in Singapore, marking the first time that heads of state met from the two 
countries since the end of the Korean War in 1953 (“Timeline”). However, a subsequent meeting 
between the two leaders in Hanoi, Vietnam in 2019 ended early after rising tensions surrounding 
North Korean sanctions relief and American demands for denuclearization. Since then, the 
relationship between Trump and Kim has continued to waver, with the future looking 
increasingly uncertain. Relief in economic sanctions could further improve the quality of life for 
the average North Korean, contributing to the factors mentioned above, or it could lead to a 
greater hoarding of resources by the government and strengthen the hold of the Kim family 
dynasty across North Korea. Either outcome would have an impact on foreign media and North 
Korean perceptions of the state.  
Another further line of study will be how the global pandemic of COVID-19, a new strain 
of coronavirus, will impact North Korea. As of March 9, 2020, North Korea had placed 
approximately 10,000 of its citizens and foreign nationals under mandatory quarantine. An 
estimated 4,000 individuals were released from quarantine after they failed to show symptoms of 
the virus, and official numbers from North Korean state media show the number of COVID-19 
cases as zero (Koh). However, many experts believe that the government could be engaging in a 
massive cover-up to hide its outbreak from the rest of the world, with some reports suggesting 
that 200 North Korean soldiers have already died from the virus (Mahbubani). 
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 Despite North Korea’s attempts to downplay the virus and erase its impact, North 
Koreans will understand that something major is interrupting their daily lives when their loved 
ones and friends begin to die. Meanwhile, North Korea has already taken steps such as shutting 
its borders, closing schools and many public sites, and banning all tourism, but despite these 
measures, North Korea’s weak healthcare system may not be able to cope with the impacts of the 
virus. Furthermore, an estimated 11 million North Koreans are malnourished, inhibiting the 
ability of North Koreans of all ages to recover from the virus (Terry). The COVID-19 pandemic 
will be Kim Jong-Un’s greatest challenge of his rule so far, and if the outbreak has a similar 
effect on the country as the great famine of the 1990s, the impacts it has on foreign information 
dissemination and North Korean perceptions of the state and outside world could be 
extraordinary. 
North Korea has simultaneously maintained its tight control on its population for three 
generations and changed more in the past decade than it has throughout its entire history. There 
are a number of social, political, economic, and medical factors currently in play that will require 
North Korea to continue this rapid adaptation to the 21st century world, or risk complete 
collapse. These massive global and national issues, however, do not detract from the ability of 
the North Korean people to demonstrate agency over their own lives and the future of their 
country. Illicit consumption of foreign media is just one way in which North Koreans gain 
information about the world outside their country and practice small, daily acts of civil 
disobedience to the state. The future of North Korea continues to be as uncertain and uncharted 
as ever before, but the impacts of foreign media are clear and cannot be undone, no matter the 
actions of the supreme leader.  
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